From the Princeton Weekly Bulletin October 6, 1997
Course examines what works and what
doesn't for modern United NationsBy Mary Caffrey
The headlines from Bosnia and Herzegovina offer a dismaying drumbeat: Former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadic carries on a power struggle with President Biljana Plavsic; Karadic flouts inter-national authority as the de facto ruler in the Pale region and ignores charges of war crimes brought against him.
Meanwhile, a team of diplomats squabbles over whether to certify local elections held in mid-September, elections complicated not only by meddling from ousted rulers but by the thousands of refugees who had the right to vote in absentia.
Trouble in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia is no surprise to Professor of Politics and International Affairs Michael Doyle, who became director of the Center of International Studies in July. Nearly two years after the United States brokered a peace agreement in Dayton, Ohio, among Serb, Croatian and Muslim leaders,
the former Yugoslavia remains a very fractured place. Yet, Doyle says, a relatively successful operation in a part of Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, offers hope and many lessons for the United Nations. This fall, undergraduates in Doyle's class, Peacemaking, will hear of these lessons, now that Doyle has tailored the course to give more attention to what is perhaps the toughest peacekeeping mission the UN has ever undertaken.
Eastern Slavonia
The course will cast the situation in the former Yugoslavia alongside other stories of failure and success, as students examine what works and what does not for the modern United Nations. Students will hear firsthand observations from Doyle, who spent the summer traveling in Eastern Slavonia, an area that saw much blood-shed but one that has recovered more rapidly than Bosnia, where the military part of the UN operation, led by NATO, is collapsing. The eastern and southern regions of Croatia were overrun twice, Doyle said, first by Serbs who killed up to 10,000 Croatians, and later by Croatians who may have killed up to 10,000 Serbs.
Eastern Slavonia, the easternmost province of Croatia, is now under UN administration. What makes this region worth studying, Doyle said, is that it serves as a capsule of the larger problems facing the entire peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia: Can the UN guarantee human rights, including fair elections? Can a new round of genocide be prevented? How can the international community help refugees return home? How can outsiders help restart the shattered economy?
Eastern Slavonia has benefited from something that Doyle says has been missing elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia: direct control from a single, forceful leader, U.S. Air Force Major General Jacques Klein. Like other administrators, Klein found that his biggest problem was the 40,000 refugees, in this case Serbs, who have been unable to go home. But because Klein was recognized by all parties as the commander, "Serbs came to look at him as their leader, their protector," Doyle said.
Common threads
For Doyle, the essential questions about Eastern Slavonia are, With all its advantages, will the peace last? Will the basic rights of Serbs in the region be protected after the operation ends in January 1998? Students in the course will tackle these questions and others, such as: What are the root causes of civil war? How can civil wars be ended? In some places, Doyle said, "There is also the broader question of whether any strategy that relies on outside assistance works."
Doyle has spent years examining the common threads of war and peace. His book, Ways of War and Peace, published this year, examines classical political theory on interstate relations, from the Realists, including Thucydides and Machiavelli, to Liberals such as Kant, to Socialists through Lenin. In the concluding chapter, Doyle uses the classical lessons to ponder "zones of peace" and balances of power that may exist in the future, as the absence of a bilateral Cold War structure gives way to four or five powers and multiple smaller conflicts.
Doyle has also served as a coeditor for three volumes published this year: Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador, New Thinking in International Relations Theory and Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century.
Two-step solution
In December 1995, Doyle coauthored an essay with Elizabeth Cousens that served as road map for the problems that have befallen the UN operation in Bosnia. The Dayton peace accords, Doyle and Cousens wrote, correctly identified a two-step solution--a "cooling off" period followed by a period of intense "nation building." Both phases would require the presence of NATO forces, including U.S. troops, working under a UN mandate. But the American public only heard about the first piece of the mission and was told the operation would be complete in a year. While the first group of soldiers has been replaced, the perception of a broken promise makes it more difficult to maintain support among the public and in Congress.
Doyle and Cousens also noted that the Dayton accords relied on many countries and international agencies to carry out the nation-building phase, which includes the training of local police and the rebuilding of the economy. However, the Dayton document did not spell out clear lines of authority. The setup "is almost designed to provide excuses, to blame somebody else" if failure occurs, Doyle said.
For example, the Clinton Administration only recently convinced its allies that the NATO forces should collect and account for military-style weapons held by private police forces, some of which provide security for figures like Karadic. This has been a problem since the start of the implementation of the Dayton accords, but the Implementation Forces (IFOR), which handled the first part of the mission, ignored this problem--they were charged only with handling "military aspects" of the agreement. The IFOR replacements, known as the Stabilization Forces (SFOR), also saw the police forces as a UN responsibility, even though the UN had no ability to deal with them. In late spring, the Clinton Administration realized it had a problem on its hands--the SFOR troops are scheduled to leave in June 1998, and Bosnia is far from ready for their departure. Doyle warns that without more aggressive nation building, or nation separation, a decision on whether to pull out troops and risk chaos in Bosnia "will be in the headlines by June of 1998."
Many success stories
Students in Doyle's Peacemaking course will examine UN operations in El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, the Persian Gulf, Rwanda and Somalia, as well as the former Yugoslavia. They will then be asked to write a paper evaluating a UN mission not discussed in class. They will have plenty of choices, including many success stories. Doyle notes, "Of the total of 33 UN peacekeeping operations mounted since 1948, 20 have been started just since 1988."
According to Doyle, the end of the Cold War offered the UN a chance to become "what it was meant to be." At the same time, however, the fall of Communism throughout Europe dampened the American public's willingness to get involved overseas. The more difficult the mission, Doyle said, the more ambivalent Americans and their leaders can be, which accounts for President Clinton's delayed response to the bloodshed in Bosnia.
"Americans want the United States to participate in the UN," Doyle said. "At the same time, we don't want to be the only global policeman. People don't expect to lose their sons and daughters when we're not at risk."
What works?
So what works? Doyle said the UN succeeds in the area of implementing negotiated peace settlements, including election monitoring, but is not good at enforcement operations, such imposing a settlement on hostile factions. Doyle believes those tasks, when justified, are best left to individual nations or to NATO.
Operations succeed, he said, when there is coordination on the ground. As good as it sounds when many countries send troops, such multi-national forces are difficult to manage. As the case of Eastern Slavonia proves, Doyle said, someone has to be in charge.
Above all, he said, success requires strong leadership. Good leaders can convince brave refugees to return home, to set up a new economy and to feel secure. "Leadership," Doyle said, "helps make vicious circles into virtuous circles."
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